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ABSTRACT 
 
In contrary to what might be expected from the results of previous research conducted on media 
freedom, there is a variation in both perceived corruption and quality of government (QoG) among 
countries with free media. This paper suggests that there is a need for complementary and more 
precise measures of media system characteristics in order to understand the role of the media in the 
fight against corruption and in promoting QoG. The purpose of this study is therefore to develop 
and use alternative media system measures to empirically test the relationship between media sys-
tem characteristics and QoG and in what way media system characteristics can explain variations in 
QoG across 36 European countries. The results show that media freedom is a basic condition that 
is essential for media to play any role in promoting QoG. However, the results of this study also 
imply that accessibility and citizens’ ability to obtain information delivered by the free media are at 
least as important. 
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Introduction 
According to a large number of studies, there is a robust positive relationship between a free media 
and democracy (see e.g., Adserà, Boix, & Payne, 2003; Becker, Vlad, & Nusser, 2007; Norris, 2004; 
Pasek, 2006; Prior, 2007), economic development (see e.g., Besley & Prat, 2006; Coyne & Leeson, 
2004; Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova, & Shleifer, 2003; Norris, 2008), and lower levels of corruption 
(see e.g., Ahrend, 2002; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Camaj, 2012; Charron, 2009; Chowdhury, 2004; 
Freille, Haque, & Kneller, 2007; Färdigh, Andersson, & Oscarsson, 2012; Lessmann & Markwart, 
2010; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010; Macdonell & Pesic, 2006). However, contrary to what might be 
expected from previous research on the relationship between a free media and corruption, there is a 
significant variation in outcomes among countries, despite the fact that they have equivalent levels 
of free media. Moreover, despite the coherent empirical results provided by previous studies, pin-
pointing what sorts of mechanisms within media freedom actually lead to lower levels of corruption 
is an intricate matter and more research is needed in this area.     
This study proposes two possible processes which could contribute to understanding of the roles 
that a free media fulfills in establishing and maintaining well-functioning governmental institutions, 
and why a free media sometimes leads to higher “quality of government” (QoG) and sometimes 
not. First, this paper suggests a need for complementary and more precise measures of countries’ 
media systems in order to move beyond the conclusion that a free media is a “quick fix”. Second, 
this paper suggests that the dependent variable of interest needs to be specified further. A free me-
dia is essential for democracy and therefore there is a risk of spurious correlations. Moreover, de-
mocracies can have low QoG and authoritarian states high QoG (Charron & Lapuente, 2010). The 
concept of democracy only captures the access to public authority and misses the way in which pub-
lic authority is exercised. This study aims to shed light on this by incorporating other dimensions of 
media systems and by using the concept of QoG which here refers to the ability a regime has to perform 
its activities in an efficient, impartial way and without corruption (see Charron & Lapuente, 2010; Linde, 
2012; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). The QoG concept captures the output side of public authority 
(the “quality”, not “quantity” of the policies delivered by a government). 
The media systems of Europe are a particularly interesting field of study as Europe is the only re-
gion that has undergone extensive democratic transitions and processes of democratization in the 
last few decades due to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe (Nagle & Mahr, 1999). In 20 
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years, the former communist states have transformed their command economies and centralized 
political systems into capitalist liberal democracies, a process which also has implications for the 
European countries’ media systems. The purpose of this study is thus to develop and use comple-
ments to media freedom measures and to test their impact empirically on the variation in QoG 
across 36 European countries (see Table A1, Appendix).  
This paper proceeds as follows. In section two, the complementary characteristics used to concep-
tualize and compare countries’ media systems are discussed and operationalized. In this section the 
results of previous research and theories of what determines QoG are also outlined. The third sec-
tion introduces the data and sample, the results are presented in the section four and the fifth sec-
tion concludes. 
 
The role of a free media in promoting QoG 
A large body of cross-country evidence suggests the importance of media freedom (Ahrend, 2002; 
Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Camaj, 2012 Charron, 2009; Chowdhury, 2004; Freille et al., 2007; Fär-
digh, Andersson, & Oscarsson, 2012; Lessmann & Markwart, 2010; Macdonell & Pesic, 2006; Nor-
ris, 2004; Olken & Barron, 2009; Stapenhurst, 2004). By highlighting policy failures and corruption 
in the judiciary, and exposing maladministration by public officials, free media fulfills a “watchdog” 
role and can thus function to promote government transparency, accountability, and public scrutiny 
of those in power (see e.g., Norris, 2008). Brunetti and Weder (2003) found that there was less 
corruption in countries with free media. Furthermore, Salbu (2001) suggests that the Internet offers 
people unprecedented access to information, resulting in a more knowledgeable society, or as stated 
by Norris and Zinnbauer (2002), free media and widespread Internet access are often associated 
with nations that experience greater administrative efficiency, improved social and economic condi-
tions, and lower levels of corruption. 
Although most agree that free media plays a role in detecting corruption, there is reason to suggest 
that the positive net effect of free media may be overstated (see e.g., Graber, 1986; Vaidya, 2005). 
Corruption also exists within the structure of media organizations: journalists and the media may 
themselves be corrupted. Alternatively, there is also the possibility of a backward causation, i.e., 
higher QoG leads to freer media. However, theoretical and empirical arguments suggest that a free 
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media is more likely to reinforce QoG than vice versa. The notion of reversed causality does not 
appear to be entirely misguided, but very little attention has been paid to it in the literature thus far 
(see e.g., Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Norris, 2004). 
To find an answer to the question of how and when a free media is likely to play a significant role in 
the fight against corruption and in promoting QoG, there is a need to incorporate complements to 
“overused” press freedom indices and to flesh out the concept of media freedom. In the economics 
literature, media freedom indicators are often used as proxies for citizens’ accessibility to infor-
mation but there is a lack of reliable data measuring the information that is actually available to 
citizens, and the costs involved in obtaining information and citizens’ motivations and abilities to 
process the information are not explored (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010; see also Delli Caprini & 
Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990). Democratic processes and participation depend on a well-informed 
citizenry and therefore represent a crucial element in enabling media to strengthen democratization, 
human development and QoG. A free media provides citizens with the information they need in 
order to be free end self-governing, but also provides the government with the information it needs 
in order to rule in the interests of the people. As Norris (2008) puts it, a free media has several 
roles, namely “... as a watch-dog over the abuse of power (promoting accountability and transpar-
ency), as a civic forum for political debate (facilitating informed electoral choices), and as an agen-
da-setter for policymakers (strengthening government responsiveness to social problems)” (p. 70). 
In turn, a complete realization of the right to a free flow of information cannot take place without a 
free media. 
Early definitions of media freedom have predominantly focused on freedom vis-à-vis the state and 
from governmental control, and explanations of the variation in media freedom across countries 
has been found in the historical dimensions of these countries’ media systems (see e.g., Altschull, 
1984; Hachten, 1981; Martin & Chaudhary, 1983; Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979; Siebert, Peterson, & 
Schramm, 1956; Williams, 1962).  
However, media freedom does not necessarily equal media accessibility or that citizens have access 
to the information conveyed to them by the free media. The point of departure in this study is that 
accessibility is a “triggering” factor that affects the relationship between media freedom and QoG: 
i) accessibility triggers media freedom; ii) accessibility, on the other hand, is determined by specific 
characteristics within the media system; and iii) the media system in turn is determined by specific 
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national characteristics such as the relationship between economic and political interests, and his-
torical and cultural circumstances. Hallin and Mancini (2004) studied how countries’ political and 
economic systems influence the media system; their view is that media institutions both affect and 
are affected by the society in which they operate (cf., Siebert et al., 1956). Their comparative analy-
sis of media systems results in four dimensions along which the relationship between political and 
economic systems and the media system is most evident. The first dimension is how the media market 
in different countries has evolved over time, with an emphasis on a strong or weak mass distributed press. 
The second dimension is political parallelism, i.e. the link between the media system and political 
power, and the reflection of political power and the political system in the media system. The third 
dimension examines the development of a journalistic profession and the scope of journalistic professionalism. 
Finally, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012) investigate the prevalence and manifestations of political power, 
and the influence and impact of political power on the media system.  
Inspired by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012), this study focuses on two different characteristics of 
European countries’ media systems that are potential explanatory factors of the variation in QoG. 
The first captures three aspects of media freedom (economic, political and judicial control over 
media content). In addition, this paper proposes that there is a need for complementary media sys-
tem indicators and for investigation of the ability to obtain the information disseminated by the free 
media. Therefore, the second set of media system characteristics captures citizens’ access to media, 
which this paper argues can provide more information about the relationship between media free-
dom and QoG.  
 
Media freedom 
The first set of characteristics captures three aspects of media freedom. The first aspect evaluates “the 
economic considerations that can influence the media’s activities” (Freedom House, 2010), and the 
structure and concentration of media ownership, the extent of sponsorship, subsidization and ad-
vertising and their effect on media coverage and content. For example, privately-owned media or 
media owned or controlled by the government could influence the diversity of views in the same 
way as geography or poor infrastructure could limit dissemination of print, broadcast, or internet-
based sources of information. The second aspect evaluates “the degree of political control over the 
content of news media” (Freedom House, 2010), and the editorial independence of the media, in-
 7 
timidation of and threats to journalists, and access to informational sources. For example, the gov-
ernment, particular partisan interests, or unspoken “rules” and agreements between journalists and 
officials could prevent journalists from pursuing certain stories and thus determine the information 
content. Finally, the third aspect encompasses “both an examination of the laws and regulations 
that could influence media content, as well as the government's inclination to use these laws and 
legal institutions in order to restrict the media’s ability to operate” (Freedom House, 2010). Insult 
laws could routinely be used to shield officials’ conduct from public scrutiny in the same way as 
restrictions to the right of access information could expressly and narrowly be defined. 
Although one could assume that these three aspects might run in different directions, the main 
theoretical argument in this study is that access to information should provide ordinary citizens 
with knowledge; citizens can only act on malfeasance if they know about it. A politically, economi-
cally or judicially “free” media creates opportunities for citizens to learn of malfeasance and pro-
vides them with ways of knowing about it. Consequently, a free media leads to better QoG in that 
openness in public and private institutional operations should enhance the ability of – in this case – 
governments to perform its activities in an efficient, impartial way without corruption. Better in-
formation flows and a free media enhance government efficiency and responsiveness, while 
strengthening citizens’ trust in those who govern them. Thus, QoG is more likely to be higher in 
countries where media systems are characterized by: (a) fewer economic considerations that can 
influence media activities; (b) less political control over the news media content; (c) fewer laws and 
regulations that restrict media content and less inclination on the part of government to use these 
laws and legal institutions in a negative manner. 
 
Media accessibility 
The second set of complementary media system characteristics, media accessibility is examined in 
relation to three different aspects and evaluates the extent to which citizens have access to infor-
mation through: a) newspapers; b) television; c) digital media. Media circulation has been recog-
nized as an important favorable condition for accountability (see e.g., Besley & Burgess, 2001). 
Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) confirm this and state that just making information available will not 
prevent corruption or help countries develop higher QoG. Other scholars have demonstrated that 
accessibility to information is a crucial determinant of bureaucratic efficiency and corruption in that 
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well-informed citizens can act upon the information they receive from the media (see e.g., Besley & 
Prat, 2006); this is even more common in countries with widespread access to digital media and 
high Internet penetration (Best & Wade, 2009; Groshek, 2009; Nisbet, Stoycheff, & Pearce, 2012).  
Putnam (2000) demonstrates that newspaper readership creates well-informed citizens with both 
the interest and capacity to hold politicians accountable for their actions. However, the presence of 
a strong mass-distributed press is not a guarantee of diversity of information. Rather, some scholars 
argue that there is a risk of institutionalized particularism and that a strong press will either promote 
their own interests or those of elites (see e.g., Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). However, Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) show that there is a geographical distribution of newspaper-centric media systems (mainly in 
northern Europe) and television-centric media systems (mainly in southern Europe) and that the 
development of a strong mass-distributed press is accompanied by differences in the related roles 
of print and online media where citizens in countries without a strong mass-distributed press rely 
heavily on online media for information (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 24; see also Norris, 2002; 
Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011). Moreover, Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) showed most recently that Internet 
access is closely associated with control of corruption and argues that there is huge potential in 
using online media and blogs to build control of corruption.   
Applied to this study, this means that the lack of a free and accessible media makes it difficult for 
information about the exercise of public authority to have any major impact. Moreover, this is not 
just about access to information in its core sense but also access to diverse independent sources of 
information. Thus, QoG is likely to be higher in countries where media systems are characterized 
by: (a) high accessibility to information through newspapers; (b) high accessibility to information 
through television; (c) high accessibility to information through the Internet. Consequently, QoG is 
likely to be higher in countries where media systems are characterized by both a free media and high 
accessibility to a range of sources of information and media content. 
 
Other determinants of QoG 
What explains cross-country differences in QoG besides a free media? Needless to say, there are 
factors other than media system characteristics that matter. There is a growing body of literature 
that considers historical factors as major determinants of present governmental performance (Ac-
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emoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Tabellini, 2008). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny (1999) argue that the theories of determinants of QoG and government performance can be 
distinguished between three broad categories: political, economic, and cultural. Political theories 
hold that policies and institutions are shaped by those in power to stay in power and to transfer 
resources to themselves. Thus, government policies are inefficient not because they are expensive 
to fix, but because their creators want them so (see e.g., Marx, 1872; North, 1990; Olson, 1993). 
Economic theories, in contrast, focus on efficiency rather than redistribution and hold that gov-
ernment institutions are created when it is beneficial and efficient to create them (see e.g., Demsetz, 
1967; North, 1981). In conclusion, according to cultural theories, societies hold beliefs that shape 
collective action and government (see e.g., Banfield, 1958; Landes, 1998; Putnam, 1993; Weber, 
1958). In the wording of La Porta et al. (1999), “some societies are so intolerant or distrustful that 
their governments simply cannot function effectively” (p. 223).  
La Porta et al. (1999) emphasize the need to find reasonably exogenous sources of variation in the 
political, economic and cultural characteristics of countries to be able to explain the variation in 
QoG across countries. They also present clear evidence of the systematic influence of historical 
circumstances, as captured by ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, legal origins and religion, on the varia-
tion in QoG across countries. QoG is in part determined by economic development, but is also 
shaped by systematic variation in the histories of individual countries. Ethnolinguistically homoge-
neous countries have governments with higher QoG than heterogeneous ones. Common law coun-
tries have higher QoG than French civil law and socialist law countries. Predominantly Protestant 
countries have higher QoG than either predominantly Catholic or predominantly Muslim countries 
(La Porta et al., 1999, pp. 265-266). 
In recent years there is a growing body of literature studying the influence of legal traditions, argu-
ing that the legal traditions established in Europe centuries ago are the key factor in explaining cur-
rent cross-country differences in institutions and socio-economic outcomes (see e.g., La Porta et al., 
2008; Levine, 2005). The main theoretical argument is that countries with common law and civil 
law have distinct routines of governmental control of the economy and different institutions sup-
porting these routines. In contrast, however, other scholars contend that the development of a 
certain kind of state infrastructure is the essential feature explaining institutional, economic and 
social development. They argue that the state formation process precedes legal traditions in that the 
characteristics of the state infrastructure constrain or enable subsequent rulers’ capacity to imple-
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ment their will and should be seen as an outcome of the ruler vs. administrators’ power balance 
rather than of legal traditions (see e.g., Charron, Dahlström, & Lapuente, 2012). Moreover, numer-
ous studies have analyzed the impact of different types of political regimes and institutions on QoG 
(see e.g., Bäck & Hadenius, 2008; Clauge, Keefer, Knack, & Olson, 1996; Keefer, 2007; Monitola & 
Jackman, 2002; Persson & Tabellini, 2003) and Charron and Lapuente (2010), for example, suggest 
a non-linear relationship in that “poorer countries seem to have higher quality of government under 
authoritarian rule while moderate-to-wealthier countries perform better under democratic rule” (p. 
445). 
Finally, several scholars have found that a greater number of women in positions of political power 
lead to lower levels of corruption (Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001; Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azfar, 
2001). The causal direction of the relationship has been questioned (see e.g., Bjarnegård, 2006; 
Goetz, 2007; Sung, 2003), but there is consensus on the fact that the number of women in leading 
political and bureaucratic positions within a society is a useful “proxy” for good governance (see 
e.g., Wängnerud, 2008). 
Following the results of previous empirical work, this study considers five general determinants 
among those likely to affect QoG. The first determinant is the ethnic heterogeneity in a country. 
This determinant has been identified by previous research as an important measure of redistributive 
tendencies (see e.g., Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003; Easterly & Lev-
ine, 1997). The prediction of political theories is that governments become more interventionist 
and less efficient as ethnic heterogeneity increases. La Porta et al. (1999) show that ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (as a proxy for political influence) has a highly consistent adverse effect on QoG. 
Hence, the independent effect of media systems on QoG will be stronger in less ethnolinguistically 
fractionalized countries.  
The second determinant is the countries’ legal systems as an indicator of the relative power of the 
state vis-à-vis property owners. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) show that legal origins, particu-
larly socialist and French, exert a significant adverse influence on QoG. Governments in countries 
of socialist legal origin are more interventionist across the board (have worse protection of property 
rights, more intrusive regulation and higher tax rates), as well as being less efficient (lower scores on 
bureaucratic delays and tax compliance, although not on corruption) compared to common law 
countries, in part because the extreme power of the state corrupts the bureaucracies (La Porta et al., 
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1999, p. 231). Hence, the independent effect of media systems on QoG will be stronger in coun-
tries with non-socialist legal origins.  
The third determinant is the religious affiliation of the population. La Porta et al. (1999) focus in 
particular on the Catholic and Muslim religions, which have been singled out as hostile to institu-
tional development (p. 224). Compared to Protestant countries, both Catholic and Muslim coun-
tries are associated with lower QoG. Catholic countries are generally more interventionist and pay 
relatively higher government wages than Protestant countries, but with bureaucracies that are still 
less efficient, more corrupt and significantly less democratic (La Porta et al., 1999, pp. 262-267). 
Hence, the independent effect of media systems on QoG will be stronger in countries with a 
Protestant religious affiliation.  
As the fourth determinant of QoG, this study considers per capita income. La Porta et al. (1999) 
ultimately focused on other determinants due to problems with endogeneity, but per capita income 
is potentially an important determinant nonetheless. Although it is likely that good institutions 
themselves will improve economic conditions, there is still strong evidence that economically free 
and open nations tend to have lower levels of corruption (see e.g., Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Treis-
man, 2000). Hence, the independent effect of media systems on QoG will be stronger in more 
economically developed countries. 
Finally, the fifth determinant of QoG is political empowerment. Several findings point to a negative 
relationship between political empowerment and the level of corruption. Moreover, the findings 
also highlight that the casual mechanism seems to be that corruption causes particular harm to poor 
sections of the population and that women are generally more affected by dysfunctional govern-
ments. Wängnerud (2010, p. 19), for example, concludes that both the number of women in par-
liament and the level of equality seem to have a positive effect on QoG. Hence, the independent 
effect of media systems on QoG will be stronger in countries with high political empowerment. 
 
Data 
The analysis is based on a dataset of measures of QoG and media system variables which are likely 
to be potential determinants of QoG in 36 European countries. The data were gathered from a 
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variety of sources and typically also come from different years although the independent variables 
and control variables were gathered no later than 2010. 
The European countries’ QoG is measured using the International Country Risk Guide’s annual 
QoG index from 2012, which evaluates corruption within the political system, the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, the observance of the law, and the institutional strength and quality 
of the bureaucracy. This index is similar to that used by Hall and Jones (1999) as a measure of the 
quality of “the institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment” (p. 
97). The components of this index have also been used in the political economics literature as 
measures of government efficiency (Knack & Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999).  
The European countries’ media freedom is measured using Freedom House’s sub-indices which 
examine economic influences, political pressures and controls, and laws and regulations that influ-
ence media content. Media accessibility is measured through three different variables: the accessibil-
ity to information through newspapers is operationalized by newspaper circulation, accessibility to 
information through television is operationalized by viewing time per individual, and accessibility to 
information through the Internet is operationalized by the level of Internet access via broadband 
for each European country.  
To capture the historical determinants of QoG, the study uses variables derived from La Porta et al. 
(1999) and the variables which proved to be most influential on government performance and 
QoG in their study. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization captures five different component indices of ethnic 
diversity, originally developed by Easterly and Levine (1997) and extended with data from Alesina 
et al. (2003). Countries’ legal origin is captured by a dummy variable that indicates whether a country 
has a socialist legal origin or not. A variable that captures the percentage of each country’s popula-
tion reported to be Protestants is used to measuring religious affiliation. To measure economic develop-
ment, data on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) 
were retrieved from the World Bank. Finally, the political empowerment measure is one of the sub-
indices used to construct the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index. The variable is 
a combination of i) the ratio of female to male members in the parliament, ii) the ratio of women to 
men in ministerial level positions, and iii) the ratio of women to men in positions of head of state 
or head of government in the last 50 years (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2010, p. 4). The sources 
and definitions of all the variables used in this article are summarized in Table A2 (see Appendix). 
 13 
Table 1 presents the correlations between the independent variables and reveals a number of inter-
esting patterns. First, there are strong positive correlations between the media freedom variables. It 
is primarily political pressures and judicial influences that show positive correlations with countries’ 
newspaper markets and the negative correlations are to be found between laws and regulations and 
the part of accessibility to information captured by the Internet access variable. It is also interesting 
to note the positive correlations between the media freedom variables and the media accessibility 
indicator of newspaper circulation. Second, European countries where television can be considered 
to have a strong and prominent position seem less likely to have a strong mass-distributed press. 
Countries in which television plays a prominent role in the media system have less access to the 
Internet via broadband, are more ethnolinguistically fractionalized, and typically have a socialist 
legal origin and lower percentages of Protestants. The media accessibility variables confirm these 
patterns. European countries with a socialist legal origin and lower percentages of Protestants are 
more likely to have lower levels of newspaper circulation and higher viewing time per individual. 
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TABLE 1. CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (PEARSON’S R)  
 
 Media Freedom Media Accessibility Control Variables 
  
Economic 
influences 
Political 
pressures 
and 
controls 
Laws and 
regulations 
Newspaper 
circulation 
Viewing 
time per 
individual 
Internet 
access 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(PPP) 
Political 
empowerment 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
Legal 
origin 
(Socialist) 
Political pres-
sures and 
controls 
.915**          
Laws and 
regulations 
.882** .931**         
Newspaper 
circulation 
.525* .571** .472*        
Viewing time 
per individual  
-.208 -.324 -.252 .468*       
Internet access .475* .561** -.584** -.629** .462*      
GDP per capita 
(PPP) 
.060 -.010 .042 -.116 -.216 -.077     
Political em-
powerment 
.423 .474* .486* -.601** .529* -.718** -.088    
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
-.286 -.258 -.279 .365 -.174 .215 .323 .193   
Legal origin 
(Socialist) 
-.491* -.391 -.419 .448* -.280 .448* .361** .361 -.411  
Religious 
affiliation 
(Protestant) 
.420 .487* .413 -.670** .414 -.743** .015 -.740** .243 .289 
 
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 1% level. * Correlation is significant at the 5% level. 
 
Results 
The regression results are presented in two different tables and even though neither of the tests 
used for detecting heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan and White) showed any indication of improp-
er model specifications, robust standard errors are used for more efficient estimates and more accu-
rate p values. In Table 2, the variables used for measuring each of the two different media system 
characteristics are included stepwise. Table 3 includes the media system characteristics as construct-
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ed indices separately (Model 1 and Model 2) and together (Model 3). By controlling for GDP per 
capita, historical factors and political empowerment, the explanatory power of the media system 
characteristics on the variation in QoG is tested. 
 
TABLE 2. MEDIA SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS AND QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT 
        
 Media Freedom Step I Step II Step III    
Economic influences 
(fh_econ) 
-.026*** 
(.002) 
-.006     
(.004) 
-.006    
(.009)    
Political pressures and controls 
(fh_pol) 
 
-.016*** 
(.003) 
-.011** 
(.004)    
Laws and regulations 
(fh_law) 
  
-.007    
(.004)    
        
 Media Accessibility       Step I Step II Step III 
Newspaper circulation 
(wan_cpa) 
   
.001*** 
(.0002) 
.001*** 
(.0002) 
.001** 
(.0002) 
Viewing time per individual 
(imc_vtpi) 
    
-.001    
(.001) 
-.001    
(.001) 
Internet access 
(eu_ia) 
     
.005*** 
(.001) 
 Constant 
.945*** 
(.024) 
.924*** 
(.022) 
.924*** 
(.022) 
.491*** 
(.045) 
.741*** 
(.211) 
.556** 
(.188) 
 N countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 
 Mean VIF 1.00 6.17 8.32 1.00 1.28 1.62 
 Adjusted R² 0.48 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.55 0.70 
                
 
Notes: *p < .01, **p < .05, ***p < .001. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with robust standard errors 
within parentheses. 
 
Among the variables that indicate the media freedom characteristics of the media systems, econom-
ic influences show a significant negative effect in the first step but become insignificant and much 
weaker when the variables that measure political influences and laws and regulations are included. 
This confirms previous results that suggest that it is primarily the political environment that drives 
the strong relationship between press freedom and corruption and that it also applies to variations 
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in QoG across countries (see e.g., Freille et al., 2007). If the media fail to stay independent of politi-
cal influences, this is likely to lead to negative consequences for countries’ QoG in that agreements 
and unspoken “rules” between journalists and officials, for example, seem to impede the flow of 
information and prevent stories of misconduct and malfeasance reaching the citizens.    
Finally, only two of the three variables in the media accessibility dimension show significant effects 
on QoG. There is no significant effect of television viewing time per individual, which indicates 
that television viewership and newspaper readership seem to be interrelated. The results instead 
suggest that countries with more newspaper-centric media systems and high accessibility to infor-
mation also tend to have higher QoG. 
Thus, when the effects of the European countries’ media system characteristics on QoG are exam-
ined separately, it is clear that several factors play a crucial role. The results in Table 2 show that in 
countries where the media is predominantly able to maintain its freedom vis-a-vis the political envi-
ronment, this leads to higher QoG. Similarly, the results also show that countries with high news-
paper circulation also benefit from higher QoG. Finally, the results in Table 2 show that media 
accessibility is an important determinant of QoG. In European countries with high newspaper 
circulation and where citizens are able to easily gain access to media content and information 
through the Internet, QoG also tends to be higher.  
The following paragraphs examines which of the two media system characteristics have the strong-
est effect on the variation in QoG across the European countries and whether the effects of the 
two media system characteristics remain significant when GDP per capita, political empowerment 
and the historical determinants of QoG are brought into the regression models. 
In Table 3 the eight media system variables are re-constructed into two different indices (one for 
each media system characteristic). The main reason for doing this is to overcome the problems 
associated with over-specified models. Although the core concepts of this study have been differen-
tiated analytically, the European countries’ media system characteristics are likely to be interrelated 
with variations in QoG. Nevertheless, the analysis involving calculating the variance inflation factor 
shows that multicollinearity does not seem to be a critical issue here. The index variables have been 
reversed and standardized so that they all range between 0 and 1.  
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The results in Table 3 show that there is a significant effect of media freedom on the variation in 
QoG across the 36 European countries – the greater the media freedom the higher the QoG. Thus, 
the results in Table 2, showing that it is the political environment that primarily drives the relation-
ship between media freedom and QoG, are confirmed and the significant effect of media freedom 
remains strong even after the control variables are included in the regression model. 
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TABLE 3. MEDIA FREEDOM, MEDIA ACCESSIBILITY AND QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT. 
    
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Constructed Index    
Media Freedom  
(fh_econ+fh_pol+fh_law) 
.144***      (.029)  .132***      (.019) 
Media Accessibility 
(wan_cpa+imc_vtpi+eu_ia) 
 
.179*** 
(.037) 
.151***      (.022) 
     
 Control Variables    
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
-.094 
(.121) 
-.095 
(.112) 
-.051      (.073) 
Legal origin (Socialist) 
-.127** 
(.042) 
-.113* 
(.049) 
-.089**      (.036) 
Religious affiliation (Protestant) 
.0004 
(.0006) 
-.0002 
(.0008) 
-.0003      (.0005) 
GDP per capita (PPP) 
.000001 
(.00002) 
.00002 
(.00001) 
.00002 
(.00001) 
Political Empowerment 
.925** 
(.324) 
.302 
(.647) 
.024 
(.355) 
 Constant 
-.239 
(.205) 
.320 
(.455) 
.228 
(.248) 
 N countries 36 36 36 
 Mean VIF: 1.80 2.28 2.19 
 Adjusted R² 0.81 0.74 0.89 
      
  
    
 
Notes: *p < .01, **p < .05, ***p < .001. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with robust standard errors 
within parentheses. Some of the variables are reversed and all index variables are standardized and range between 0 and 1. On 
the reliability test (Cronbach’s alpha): the Media Freedom Index = .966 and the Media Accessibility Index = .751. 
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In Model 2 the independent variable is replaced by the media accessibility index, which shows the 
greatest explanatory power of the two indices and a significant effect on the variation in QoG. The 
results indicate that accessibility to information is a crucial determinant of QoG and thus also con-
firm the results of previous research suggesting its importance for the level of bureaucratic efficien-
cy and corruption, in that well-informed citizens are more likely to hold officials accountable for 
their actions if they can easily obtain and pass on the information. That media accessibility is of 
great importance is also confirmed when both the media freedom and media accessibility character-
istics are included in Model 3. To begin with, there are still significant effects for the index measur-
ing the three media freedom aspects that are commonly used by scholars to examine media free-
dom empirically. However, it is interesting to note that the effects of the media accessibility charac-
teristics of the European countries’ media systems are yet stronger and remain significant even 
when controlled for GDP per capita, political empowerment and the historical determinants of 
QoG. 
In summary, the results in Table 2 show that in countries where the media is predominantly able to 
maintain its freedom against the political environment, QoG also tends to be higher. When it 
comes to media accessibility, the results in Table 2 suggest that QoG tends to be higher in countries 
with newspaper-centric media systems and where citizens are able to easily gain access to online 
media content and information through the Internet. 
When the effects of countries’ media system characteristics on the variation in QoG are examined 
together with the health and well-being of countries’ economies and historical circumstances in 
Table 3, it is clear that several media system characteristics play a crucial role. When the historical 
determinants are included separately (not reported), the positive effects of the media accessibility 
variables are stronger in less fractionalized European countries. Similarly, when countries’ legal 
origins and religious affiliations are included separately, there are similar patterns. In socialist origin 
countries it is media freedom from the political environment and citizens’ accessibility to online 
information that matters most, and in Protestant countries the independent effect of the media 
freedom characteristics and media accessibility characteristics is even stronger. However, when 
GDP per capita and the three historical factors are included together, the effect from two of the 
three historical determinants of QoG disappears. Even more important, the effect of both media 
freedom and media accessibility on the variation in QoG across the European countries remained 
significant even after and although the significant effect of countries legal tradition.   
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to use complementary media system characteristics and to go be-
yond the results of previous studies that largely conclude that a free media will lead to higher levels 
of democracy, improved economic development, and lower levels of corruption. A further aim of 
this study was to test the effect of these alternative media system characteristics empirically in terms 
of their effects on the variation in QoG across European countries, and finally to examine how 
these media system characteristics could stand up against economic conditions and some of the 
historical circumstances that previous research has shown are crucial when it comes to explaining 
countries’ variations in QoG. 
The results suggest that the measurements traditionally used to assess countries’ media freedom are 
of importance for the variations in QoG across European countries per se, but only when it comes 
to the subcategory that examines political pressures and controls. In addition, the results of this 
study also show that media accessibility is just as important as media freedom in explaining varia-
tion in the European countries’ QoG. Indeed, the importance of media freedom and media acces-
sibility are so strong that two of the three historical factors completely lose their explanatory power 
in terms of direct effects.  
So why these results and what are the consequences for our understanding of the variations in the 
European countries’ media systems, the role the media plays in society, and more specifically, in 
terms of promoting high QoG? The results of this study imply that media freedom – more specifi-
cally, media freedom vis-a-vis the political environment – is an important explanatory factor for 
countries’ QoG. However, media freedom does not seem to equate to a well-informed citizenry, 
even if the latter requires the former. Thus, the results of this study pose the question of how well 
the indices scholars commonly use for the study and comparison of media freedom are in fact suc-
cessful in capturing relevant aspects of media systems in terms of accessibility to media and online 
information. In the literature, media freedom indicators are all too often equated with citizens’ ac-
cessibility to information. This also has implications for the understanding of the role of the media 
in processes of democratization, economic development, the fight against corruption, and promot-
ing QoG. The overall question that Freedom House uses to examine the aspect of media accessibil-
ity is only asked when examining one of the three subcategories – political pressures and controls – 
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and reads: “Do people have access to media coverage and a range of news and information that is 
robust and reflects a diversity of viewpoints?” (Freedom House, 2010). 
As to whether the results of this study can be generalized to all countries, the purpose of this article 
is first and foremost to explain the relationship between the media and QoG in fuller terms. The 
answer to the question of generalizability is, however, both yes and no. There are limitations in 
trying to generalize the results and to map out broader relationships from 36 cases. It is, for exam-
ple, likely that the explanatory power of the economic conditions and historical factors will change 
with a different sample of countries and regions. On the other hand, the answer is also yes, in that 
citizens’ accessibility to online media information is most likely to be a very important supplemen-
tary indicator for citizens who live in countries with reliant media and where mass circulation 
newspapers are absent, and will therefore be an equally important factor in explaining variations in 
QoG across countries both within Europe and more widely. In the last few decades, we have wit-
nessed a global change in which digital media have gained impetus. The exponential growth of the 
Internet has facilitated the creation of various types of digital media sources for information (see 
e.g., Westlund & Färdigh, 2011). Freedom is a basic condition and essential for media to play any 
role in promoting QoG, but the results from this study also imply that accessibility and citizens’ 
ability to obtain information delivered by the free media are at least as important.   
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APPENDICES 
 
TABLE A1. EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY. 
Austria Finland Lithuania  Serbia and Montenegro  
Belarus France Luxembourg  Slovakia  
Belgium Germany Malta  Slovenia  
Bulgaria Greece Netherlands  Spain  
Croatia Hungary Norway  Sweden  
Cyprus Iceland Poland  Switzerland  
Czech Republic Ireland Portugal  Turkey  
 
Denmark  
Italy Romania  Ukraine  
Estonia  Latvia 
 
Russian Federation 
United Kingdom 
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TABLE A2. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES. 
 
Variable Name Description and Source 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
 Quality of Government      
icrg_qog Measures the mean value of the ICRG variables 
“Corruption”, “Law and order”, and “Bureaucracy 
quality”, scaled 0–1 (higher values indicate 
higher quality of government). Source: The PRS 
Group, The International Country Risk Guide 
2012 
36 
 
 
0.7164 0.1855 0.42 1.00 
 Media Freedom      
Economic influences Examines the economic environment for the 
media and includes the structure of media 
ownership, the costs of establishing media, as 
well as of production and distribution, the selec-
tive withholding of advertising or subsidies by 
the state or other actors, the impact of corrup-
tion and bribery on content, and the extent to 
which the economic situation in a country 
impacts the development of the media. Scale 
from 0 to 30 (0 indicates more freedom). 
Source: Freedom House, 2010. 
36 8.97 5.810 4 28 
Political pressures and 
controls 
Evaluates the degree of political control over the 
content of news media. Issues examined include 
the editorial independence of both state-owned 
and privately-owned media, access to infor-
mation and sources, official censorship and self-
censorship, the vibrancy of the media, the ability 
of both foreign and local reporters to cover the 
news freely and without harassment, and the 
intimidation of journalists by the state or other 
actors, including arbitrary detention and impris-
onment, violent assaults, and other threats. 
Scale from 0 to 40 (0 indicates more freedom. 
Source: Freedom House, 2010. 
36 10.58 7.724 3 33 
     
Continued 
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TABLE A2 (CONTINUED) 
Laws and regulations Examines both the laws and regulations that could 
influence media content and the government’s 
inclination to use these laws and legal institutions 
to restrict the media’s ability to operate. Freedom 
House assesses the positive impact of legal and 
constitutional guarantees for freedom of expres-
sion, the potentially negative aspects of security 
legislation, the penal code, and other criminal 
statutes, penalties for libel and defamation, the 
existence of and ability to use freedom of infor-
mation legislation, the independence of the judici-
ary and of official media regulatory bodies, regis-
tration requirements for both media outlets and 
journalists, and the ability of journalists’ groups to 
operate freely. Scale from 0 to 30 (0 indicates 
more freedom). Source: Freedom House, 2010. 
36 6.79 5.537 1 27 
 Media Accessibility      
Newspaper circulation Measures the average circulation per issue in 
relation to the countries’ adult population. The 
definition of adulthood is 15 years for most of the 
countries, 14 years for Spain, 16 years for Croatia, 
Georgia, Lithuania and Macedonia, and 18 years 
for Greece, Italy and Portugal. Source: WAN – 
World Press Trends, 2010 and UNESCO, 2011. 
36 215.68 130.94 23.8 601.2 
Viewing time per 
individual 
 
Measures the viewing time per individual in 
minutes (Monday to Sunday). Source: IP Interna-
tional Marketing Committee, 2007 and Think 
TV/OzTam (Australia), 2007.  
36 209.94 40.158 154 285 
Level of Internet 
access (broadband) 
Measures the total number of households with 
Internet access in percent. The target population is 
here considered to be households with at least one 
member aged 16-74 years. Household refers to 
one person living alone or a group of people living 
together in the same dwelling unit with at least one 
person aged 16-74 years. Permanent members of 
institutions such as hospitals, prisons, etc., are 
excluded. Source: Eurostat, 2010. 
36 30.22 18.932 4 72 
     Continued 
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TABLE A2 (CONTINUED)  
 
 Control Variables  
  
 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(constant international $) 
Measures the GDP per capita based on purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) and GDP converted to 
international dollars using purchasing power over 
GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. 
Data are in constant 2005 international dollars. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indica-
tors, 2010. 
36 25336 12388 6028.9 68678.6 
Political empowerment Measures the mean ratio of female and male 
members at parliamentary and ministerial level, 
and heads of state or government in the last 50 
years. Source: World Economic Forum, Gender 
Gap Index, 2010. 
36 0.7222 0.0523 0.5876 0.8496 
Ethnolinguistic fractional-
ization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures five different indices of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization: (1) index of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization in 1960, which measures the 
probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic group; (2) the probability of two 
randomly selected individuals speaking different 
languages; (3) the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals do not speak the same 
language; (4) the percentage of the population 
not speaking the official language; (5) the per-
centage of the population not speaking the most 
widely used language. Scale from 0 to 1 (the 
higher the number, the more fractionalized the 
society). Sources: La Porta et al., 1999 and 
extended with data from Alesina et al., 2003 
(Belarus, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Georgia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Serbia and Monte-
negro, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine). 
36 0.2166 0.1711 0.0025 0.58668 
     Continued 
 
  
 32 
TABLE A2 (CONTINUED)  
Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law 
or Commercial Code of each country. La 
Porta et al. (1999) use five different variables 
to measure possible origins: (1) English 
Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; 
(3) German Commercial Code; (4) Scandina-
vian Commercial Code; and (5) Social-
ist/Communist laws. This dummy variable 
measures Socialist/Communist laws. Source: 
La Porta et al., 1999, extended with data from 
Lee, 2005 (Macedonia and Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) 
36 0.39 0.495 0 1 
Religious affiliation Identifies the percentage of the population of 
each country that belonged to Protestantism 
in 1980. The numbers are in percent (scale 
from 0 to 100) Source: La Porta et al., 1999, 
extended with data from the CIA World 
Factbook, 2001 (Lithuania, Macedonia, Serbia 
and Montenegro). 
36 19.431 32.148 0 97.8 
